新概念双语:为什么新员工永远比老员工钱多活少
来源: 环球网校 2020-01-14 10:01:12 频道: 新概念

Here is some research sure to rankle every employee who has applied for an internal promotion and been passed over in favor of someone brought in from the outside。

According to Wharton management professor Matthew Bidwell, "external hires" get significantly lower performance evaluations for their first two years on the job than do internal workers who are promoted into similar jobs. They also have higher exit rates, and they are paid "substantially more." About 18% to 20% more. On the plus side for these external hires, if they stay beyond two years, they get promoted faster than do those who are promoted internally。

"Most jobs are entered into through a variety of different routes, sometimes by being hired from the outside and sometimes by moving up from inside the firm," says Bidwell. "I was curious as to what the effect of these different routes would be" on an individual's job performance. His research is presented in a paper titled, "Paying More to Get Less: The Effects of External Hiring versus Internal Mobility."

The issue has significance for organizations, Bidwell says, as they think about where they source their employees, especially higher-level ones. Do they "grow their own" or do they go out into the job market and hire outsiders? "My research documents some quite substantial costs to external hires and some substantial benefits to internal mobility," he notes。

Getting Up to Speed

The context for Bidwell's research lies in the increased mobility of workers over the past three decades as companies have turned away from offering lifetime employment in favor of relying on the external labor market to find experienced workers at all levels of the organization。

By comparing internal mobility and external hiring processes -- looking specifically at performance and pay -- Bidwell's research can help employees learn more about "the consequences of their career decisions," including the tradeoffs that characterize internal and external mobility, Bidwell writes in his paper。

Some of those tradeoffs are easily identified. In noting that external hires need about two years "to get up to speed" in their new jobs, Bidwell suggests it is because outsiders need that amount of time to learn how to be effective in their new organization -- specifically, how to build relationships. Meanwhile, the risk of failure is substantial. Although external hires are paid quite a bit more than employees promoted into similar jobs, "this is not a free lunch for the external hires," he says. "There is a much greater risk of being let go during those first few years, mainly because they may not develop the necessary skills and thus will not perform as well as expected. Then, too, they might decide to leave voluntarily."

While doing his research, Bidwell noted one particular difference between the external hires and those already in the company who are being promoted. "People hired into the job from the outside often have more education and experience [than internal candidates], which is probably some of the reason they are being paid more," he says. "When you know less about the person you are hiring, you tend to be more rigorous about the things you can see" -- such as education and experience levels listed on a person's CV, or what Bidwell calls "externally observable attributes." And yet "education and experience are reasonably weak signals of how good somebody will be on the job, he notes。

Those tradeoffs might help explain why external hires earn so much more than internal employees promoted into the same jobs. If these hires have better resumes and are perceived as able to get a job more easily outside the company, then they can demand higher pay than internal people. Hires may also want higher pay to reflect the unfamiliar environment that they face on coming into a new position. Hiring managers confirm that they typically pay 10% or 20% more to pull people out of positions "where they already have some security and where people know them and know they are doing a good job," Bidwell says。

He acknowledges that his research may frustrate an organization's in-house workforce. "It is sadly the case that being more marketable, as external candidates are, is always going to be valuable and will generally lead to higher compensation. So the question is, should internal people threaten to quit to raise their pay?" It's well known in academia, for example, that the only way to get a significant pay raise is to nail down an outside offer, Bidwell notes. "But in some organizations, that's an easy way to get fired. People will take it as a signal that you are disloyal."

Bidwell offers this career advice: "If you like where you are, stay there. Or at least understand how hard it can be to take your skills with you. You think you can go to another job and perform well, but it takes a long time to build up to the same effectiveness that you had in your previous organization. You need to be aware that often your skills are much less portable than you think they are." Bidwell is clearly a fan of internal mobility. "While the pay may be less, your performance is better, and there is more security."

'Let's Make a Deal'

For his research, Bidwell analyzed personnel data from a US investment banking division from 2003 to 2009. In that study, he documented twice as many internal promotions as external hires. Investment banking, Bidwell writes, represents "an interesting context in which to study the effects of internal versus external mobility [because] organizational performance often depends on the skills of the workforce, [thereby] increasing the importance of personnel decisions." In addition, workers in banking are "notoriously mobile, making this a context in which organizations regularly engage in external hiring at all levels."

One important feature of investment banking jobs is that promotions tend to involve some measure of continuity with the prior job. Promotions often involve getting a higher title, such as vice president or director, while continuing to do similar work. In fact, as Bidwell notes, promotions in many organizations do not instantly lead into a very different job. Instead, responsibilities increase gradually, being recognized over time by a promotion. When considering their future staffing needs, though, organizations still must think about how they will acquire the workers capable of operating at the higher levels: Will it be by hiring or promotion?

Bidwell found similar patterns for different kinds of jobs and within different organizations. He analyzed separately the investment professionals (traders, salespeople, research analysts and investment bankers) and the support staff at the research site. His findings about pay and performance were consistent across those groups. He also looked at another investment bank and a publishing company, and found the same results of "paying more for external hires while giving them lower performance ratings."

He concludes, however, that the nature of the promotion mattered. Unlike other promoted workers, those who were simultaneously promoted and transferred to another group did not perform any better than external hires. Bidwell speculates that "the skills that are important to our jobs may be very specific to the positions that we are in. Even large changes in the nature of jobs within the organization were associated with performance declines."

Yet overall, Bidwell says, external hiring has grown much more frequent since the early 1980s, especially for experienced high level positions and especially in larger organizations. "It used to be that smaller organizations always did a lot of outside hiring while big ones focused more on internal mobility. But now the pendulum has shifted toward external hiring and away from internal mobility for large organizations as well。

"Companies should understand that it can often be harder than it seems to bring in people who look good on paper," says Bidwell. "In addition, there is a suspicion that 'the grass is always greener' attitude plays a role in some companies' desire to hire from the outside. Managers see a great CV and get excited about playing 'Let's Make a Deal,' even when it's hard to know what weaknesses the external hires bring with them."

On the other hand, "to promote more people internally also means that companies need to have a long-term perspective and know how big a pipeline of people will be needed in the future," notes Bidwell. It also requires managers to ensure that internal people are aware of the opportunities open to them. "Finally, there are clearly some costs to internal mobility -- for example, the cost of training people in-house versus piggybacking on someone else's training."

Another variable in the mobility equation, he adds, concerns non-compete clauses which tend to complicate the movement of employees between competing firms. "Although these have not always been so salient in investment banking, non-compete agreements have become increasingly important in many states and many jobs, particularly in areas like technology where employers can plausibly claim that employees will take critical competitive knowledge with them."

'Involuntary Exits'

In his paper, Bidwell argues that the differences between internal and external mobility all ultimately stem from two factors: the skills workers bring from their prior jobs, and the amount of information that firms and workers have about each other。

He comments on the significant amount of new knowledge that external hires are required to learn, even in those jobs that demand "high levels of general skills, such as securities research, scientific research and surgery... Although such work depends on individual workers' skills and knowledge, it can also require intense coordination with others in the organization." Because internal movers have longer experience within the firm, "they are likely to have already acquired important firm-specific skills that new hires will lack," Bidwell writes。

In terms of the process that takes place when firms and external employees are eyeing each other for a possible matchup, Bidwell writes that the task can be difficult because each side often has "highly incomplete information about each other. Firms struggle to evaluate the true qualities of applications, and workers struggle to know which of the jobs available will best suit their preferences and abilities." But, as Bidwell notes, companies obviously have more information about internal job candidates, including how well they have performed in prior roles and how well they fit in with the current organization。

Bidwell suggests that his paper "provides unique evidence on the value to firms of internal labor market structures. Results show that internal mobility allows the firm to staff higher-level jobs with workers who have better performance but are paid less." By detailing the strong advantage of internal mobility over external hires, he adds, "these findings help to explain the continued resilience of internal labor markets in the face of pressures for worker mobility."

企业有时候会为了从外部引进人才而忽略了内部员工的升职诉求,相信有过类似遭遇的人在看了这份调查后会更为恼火。

沃顿学院管理学教授马修·比德维尔(Matthew Bidwell)表示,相对于内部提拔的员工而言,相同岗位上的外部招聘人员在享受较高的薪金待遇(大约要高出18%到20%还多)的情况下,头两年的表现却普遍较差,且更容易辞职跳槽。不过倘若这些人能撑过头两年的话,他们的升职速度会远超过内部提拔的员工。

“大部分岗位选择候选人的方式都不是单一的,有时候会选择从外部招聘,有时候也会从公司内部进行提拔。”比德维尔说,“我很想知道这两种不同的方式会怎样影响最终入职人员的工作表现。”他将自己的研究结果写入了一篇题为《投入大收益小:外部招聘与内部提拔的效果比较》(Paying More to Get Less: The Effects of External Hiring versus Internal Mobility)的论文中。

比德维尔表示,对于组织而言,这个问题很重要。毕竟这关系到它们的员工,尤其是高级员工的来源构成问题:究竟应当“从内部培养”还是去劳动市场进行外部招聘呢?他说:“我的研究结果显示,外部招聘的成本比较高,选择内部人员流动反而有着较高的收益。”

磨合期

在过去的三十年中,企业抛弃了终身雇佣制,并开始寻求依靠外部劳动市场来发掘有经验的工人。比德维尔的研究正是在这一员工流动性大增的背景下展开的。

比德维尔通过对工作表现和工资收入的比较分析,揭示了内部提拔和外部招聘的特点,从而使得员工可以更好的了解“在职业生涯中的不同决策会导致的不同结果,”他在自己的论文中写道。

一般而言,外部招聘人员需要两年的“磨合期”才能适应新的岗位。比德维尔表示这是因为外部招聘人员需要时间来适应新的环境,主要是需要在这段时间里建立新的人脉关系。尽管外部招聘人员比起内部提拔的员工的工资要高很多,但“这绝不是天上掉馅饼的好事”,他说,“头几年很多人会选择辞职。这多半是因为他们没有培养出必要的工作技巧,就使得工作表现大大低于预期。这时候就会有人选择自动辞职。”

在研究的过程中,比德维尔注意到外部招聘和内部提拔之间有一处很明显的差异。“外部招聘来的人员(比起内部提拔的员工)教育程度更高,也更有经验。这应该就是他们能得到高薪的原因。”他说,“如果你不是很了解你想要雇佣的员工,你就会倾向于只依赖能外部观察到的东西。”就包括个人简历上的教育程度和经验水平,比德维尔称之为“外部观察属性”。但他指出,“教育程度和经验水平并非衡量一个人是否能胜任某个职位的指标。”

这就可以解释为什么相同的职位上,外部聘用人员比内部提拔上来的员工的工资要高这么多了。如果这些人简历很出色,又公认可以很轻易的找到新工作,他们自然可以要求得到更高的薪水。与此同时,高薪也有可被视为一种补偿,毕竟新的岗位就意味着要面对一个陌生的工作环境。比德维尔说,他从许多招聘经理那里得到了证实,就是要将人们从“有安全感也有成就感”的岗位上挖走,通常要加付10%到20%的工资才行。

他承认,这一研究成果也许会让组织内部员工感到沮丧。“尽管很可悲,但是跳槽确实会提升个人价值,也会提高工资水准。现在的问题是,内部员工是否应当以辞职作威胁来要求涨工资呢?”举例来说,在学术界,要想涨工资,一个新的工作邀请是必须的,比德维尔表示,“但在某些组织中,这很有可能会被视为不忠诚而导致被炒鱿鱼。”

比德维尔建议说:“如果你喜欢自己的工作,就老老实实的工作。虽然你会认为跳槽不会影响个人工作表现,但事实上,工作水准一般需要很长时间的适应后才能恢复。要知道,工作技巧可不是那么容易能带走的。”很明显,比德维尔更支持内部提拔的方式,“虽然这样工资会少一点,但能够工作的更加自如,这也就意味着你的工作更有保障”

“就这么定了”

在研究过程中,比德维尔对2003年到2009年美国投资银行人事部门的数据进行了分析。记录显示,这里外部招聘的人员数目是内部提拔的两倍。他在论文中写道,投行是“研究内外人事流动的一个绝好的范例,(因为)投行的表现更多的取决于员工自身的技能,(因而)提高了人事选择的重要程度。”此外,投行的员工“在跳槽方面的名声也是众所周知的,这就使得投行各个层次都有着定期的外部招聘行为。”

同时,投行的工作还有一个重要特点,那就是升职往往与个人此前的工作表现密切相关。升职往往意味头衔的提升,例如升为副总裁或是主管,但工作内容往往没有太大的变化。事实上,正如比德维尔指出的那样,在许多组织中,升职并不意味着工作内容的变动。相反,职责的增加是缓慢演进的,升职只是对前段工作的一个认可。当考虑到未来的员工需求时,组织仍要考虑高端员工的来源问题:究竟是招聘还是提拔呢?

比德维尔发现不同的组织中的不同的职位却存在着相似的模式。他在分析一家投行专业投资人士(贸易商,销售人员,研究分析师和投资银行家)和后勤行政人员之后,发现薪酬和绩效的关系是一致的。此外对另外一家投行和一家出版公司的研究结果也是一样,都是“外部招聘人员的薪水较高,但绩效不佳。”

他得出的一个结论是,升职之后的工作内容很重要。与其他升职的情况不同,倘若提拔后被调到新的团队中的,被提拔员工往往就不会比外部招聘人员干的更好。比德维尔认为,“良好的工作水准是与工作内容密切相关的。因此即使是组织内部的人事变动,工作内容变动过大也会影响工作发挥。”

比德维尔表示,总体来看,自20世纪80年代初以来外部招聘开始变得频繁起来,尤其是大型组织和经验需求较高的高级职位更是如此。“以前是小公司经常进行外部招聘,而大公司则倾向于内部提拔。但现在情况变了,大公司也开始放弃内部人员流动,开始采用外部招聘的方式了。”

“企业要明白,简历出色的员工引进起来并不容易。”比德维尔说,“与此同时,企业选择外部招聘有时是出于这么一个观念,那就是‘外来的和尚会念经’。看到一份很棒的简历时,管理者往往就会忽略外部招聘的各种缺点,脑袋一热就叫道:‘就这么定了。’”

而另一方面,“从内部提拔员工就意味着公司必须有着长远的眼光,能够知道将来需要多少人才。”比德维尔说。这就需要管理者保证内部人员都知道自己有这么个升职的机会。“内部提拔自然有着自身的成本。举例来说,内部提拔就意味着要支付培训员工的费用,而不是想外部招聘那样等于有别人帮自己培训员工。”

他补充道,非竞争条款也使得处于竞争状态的企业间的员工流动变得复杂起来。“尽管这点在投行中并不明显,但非竞争条款正变得越来越重要。对于性岗位技能具有排他的职位更是如此。”

非自愿退出

比德维尔在论文中提出,外部招聘和内部提拔之间的区别是基于如下两个因素:第一是员工从前一个岗位上带来的技能,第二是企业与员工之间相互了解的情况。

他表示,外部招聘人员需要学习很多知识。即使是需要“高水平的一般性技能,例如证券研究,科学研究和外科手术……尽管些工作依赖于个体劳动者的‘知识和技能’,它也需要与组织内部其他人员进行广泛协调。”而内部提拔的员工因为对企业有着较深的认识,“他们很有可能已经取得了与企业相适应的技能,而这正是新招聘来的员工所欠缺的。”比德维尔在论文中写道。

比德维尔的论文也提到,公司和外部员工之间的双向选择是一个非常困难的过程。这是因为双方“持有的对方的信息都极度不完整。公司想要评估员工的真正实力,而员工则想要弄清楚这个岗位究竟是否既符合自己的爱好,也适合自己的能力。”与此同时,企业对于内部员工的了解要更多一些,例如企业既可以了解到员工之前的岗位表现,也清楚该员工是否已经能适应自身的组织系统。

比德维尔表示,他的论文“显示了企业保持内部人员流动的价值所在。因为内部人员流动可以让公司找到薪水要求较低而工作表现却更好的员工。”在详细描述内部提拔相对于外部招聘的明显优势上,他补充说:“这些发现有助于解释当前员工流动性提升的压力下,企业内部劳力市场又开始恢复生命力的原因。”